Over 80 percent of the 1940 U.S. rental housing stock was placed under rent control during World War II. Friedman and Stigler (1946) , among others, conjectured that rent control induced property owners to place their units on the uncontrolled sales market rather than on the controlled rental market. I use newly collected data from newspaper advertisements and newly digitized data from intercensal tenure surveys to implement two empirical tests of this hypothesis. First, evidence from the staggered timing of rent control imposition shows that rent control led to an increase in the number of properties advertised for sale and a reduction in the number of properties advertised for rental. Second, conditional on the degree of pre-control rent appreciation, cities where rent control forced down rents further saw greater increases in home ownership in the first half of the 1940's. This relationship does not appear to be driven by differential trends in housing demand or by other potential sources of policy endogeneity. The results contribute to the surprisingly small literature on the effects of rent control on rental housing supply, and suggest that rent control played an important role in the rapid wartime and postwar increase in home ownership.
Introduction
...many a landlord is deciding that it is better to sell at the inflated market price than to rent at a fixed ceiling price. The ceiling on rents, therefore, means that an increasing fraction of all housing is being put on the market for owner-occupancy, and that rentals are becoming almost impossible to find, at least at the legal rents.
- Friedman and Stigler (1946) World War II saw the most widespread imposition of rent control in the history of the United States. Roughly 80 percent of the 1940 rental housing stock lay in areas that were put under rent control between 1941 and 1946 . Textbook economic models predict that rent control will reduce the supply of rental housing. Yet in their review of the vast empirical literature on rent control, Turner and Malpezzi (2003) note that there are remarkably few direct empirical tests of the effect of rent control on housing supply. 1 In this paper, I use wartime rent control to test this prediction.
In particular, I focus on one specific distortion to housing supply that may have arisen as a result of wartime rent control -that it induced landlords to sell their units for owner-occupancy at uncontrolled prices rather than rent them out at controlled prices. Many observers at the time, including Friedman and Stigler (1946) , argued based on national aggregates that rent control led to this distortion. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 1 , intercensal surveys suggest that the rate of home ownership increased by approximately 10 percentage points between 1940 and 1945, about half the size of the overall net change over the 20th century. 2 This fact is all the more striking given the severe restrictions on residential construction during the war. 3 1 On this question, Turner and Malpezzi (2003) themselves cite only a cross-country study by Malpezzi and Ball (1993) , which documents that countries with more stringent rent control have less housing investment as a share of GDP, and a time-series study by MacLennan (1978) , which documents a reduction in the number of newspaper advertisements for furnished rental housing in Glasgow after its 1974 Rent Act. Since their 2003 review, I am aware of one more recent paper directly investigating the supply effects of rent control: Sims (2007) analyzes the end of rent control in Massachusetts in 1995 and finds that rent control induced landlords to shift their properties out of rental status.
In addition to Turner and Malpezzi (2003) , Glaeser and Gyourko (2008) and Arnott (1995) also offer relatively recent reviews of the broader literature on rent control. Much of the early empirical literature estimated the size and distribution of benefits of rent control to tenants in controlled units; Olsen (1972) is an example. More recent contributions include the empirical test of misallocation proposed by Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) and work by Autor, Palmer and Pathak (2012) on the external effects of rent control on nearby uncontrolled properties.
2 Although a large share of the 1940 to 1945 increase was recovery from the 1930 to 1940 decline in the aggregate series, at the city level neither the 1930-40 change in home ownership, nor the 1920-30 change in home ownership, was strongly correlated with the 1940-45 increase for the sample used in the analysis. Hence, from the perspective of the supply of housing for rental or owner-occupancy, a return to trend is unlikely to be an adequate explanation on its own for the 1940 to 1945 increase.
3 As I discuss in further detail below, the implication is that much of the growth in home ownership was associated
Much of the rent control literature has focused on single-market case studies, in which local jurisdictions themselves choose to impose rent control, complicating the construction of an appropriate market-level counterfactual. Wartime rent control, in addition to being one of the largest interventions the federal government has ever undertaken in US housing markets, was centrally administered, which in practice generated idiosyncratic local-level variation in the timing and severity of rent control. 4 An empirical test of the hypothesis that wartime rent control increased home ownership, however, is complicated both by the paucity of tenure data from the 1940's and by the fact that most areas, and nearly all urban areas, were placed under rent control during the war.
To overcome these challenges, I leverage both newly collected and newly digitized data on urban home ownership during the early 1940's to construct two complementary tests of the rent control hypothesis.
As a first piece of evidence, I use quarterly data on classified advertisements from newspapers in nine cities, from 1939 to 1946, in combination with variation in when different cities were placed under control, to test whether imposition of control led to differential changes in the number of ads offering units for rent or houses for sale. The estimates suggest that rent control induced not only a sharp decline in the supply of rental units, but also an increase in the supply of units for owner-occupancy.
The main empirical test examines home ownership directly, using cross-city variation in the severity of rent control. Rent control rolled back rents on specific units to what they had been on a specified 'base' date, but even among cities that had similar degrees of rent appreciation prior to control, there was substantial variation in the reduction in rents forced by a rollback to the city's base date. Conditioning on the degree of rent appreciation before control, I use the implied reduction in rents from their pre-control to their base date levels as variation in the severity of rent control in each city, and test whether cities in which rent control was more severe with conversion of the same properties from renter-to owner-occupancy. Given that in modern data there is a tight link between tenure and structure type -single family units are usually owner-occupied and multifamily units are usually renter-occupied (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003) -it is important to note that in 1940 about 43 percent of single-family detached structures were renter-occupied. 4 Both Sims (2007) and Autor, Palmer and Pathak (2012) emphasize the fact that the removal of rent controls in Cambridge and other Eastern Massachusetts cities was determined by a state-wide ballot initiative rather than by a local decision. Central administration of wartime rent control is similarly helpful in my empirical setting. The results provide evidence that rent control did increase home ownership. A 2.5 percentage point reduction in rents relative to their maximum pre-control levels -roughly a standard deviation in the sample cities -was associated with roughly a 1 percentage point greater increase in home ownership. In a series of robustness checks, I show that this result cannot be explained by cities with more severe rent control having greater increases in income or savings, greater increases in benefits from the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing, or changing expectations of future city growth. Nor are they explained by the 'abnormally' low level of home ownership in 1940. To address the concern that the rent control administrators' choice of base date was correlated with unobserved factors also driving home ownership rates, I re-estimate my main specifications on a sample of cities controlled after the first wave of rent control. While base dates in the first wave were set based on rent surveys of each city, most areas controlled in the second wave were set to a 'default' base date, inducing variation in severity associated with the level of rents on the default date. I find that the severity result holds in this sample as well.
A first contribution of this paper is to offer what is, to my knowledge, the first modern evidence on the most widespread imposition of rent control in the United States. More broadly, it contributes to both an understanding of historical trends in tenure choice and of the American economy during World War II. The speed of the increase in home ownership before 1945 has not gone unnoticed by historians (Altschuler and Blumin, 2009 ), but it has been under-appreciated in the economics literature. Moreover, while there has been much work on labor markets during the war, the macroeconomic effects of war spending, and other dimensions of the wartime economy - Goldin (1991) , Higgs (1992) , Collins (2001) , Field (2008) , Cullen and Fishback (2012), and Rockoff (2012) are but a few examples -the economics literature has thus far said too little about the operation of wartime housing markets, given how prominent a role the housing shortage played at the time.
The next section gives some background on rent control and changes in wartime housing markets. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data, empirical strategy, and results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background: Rent control and wartime housing markets
The expansion of military production in the early 1940's brought a large increase in population in many urban areas (Cullen and Fishback, 2012) . As early as 1940, rising rents in the areas undergoing industrial expansion drew the attention of the federal government, which feared that rising rents would hinder war production. 5 In response to rising prices in many sectors, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 established the Office of Price Control (OPA) as an independent agency, and gave it broad powers to ration goods and to control prices and rents.
The OPA was authorized to designate geographic areas as 'defense rental areas.' After a period of 60 days following this designation, if the OPA found that rents had not been stabilized according to its recommendation, it could impose a ceiling on rents. In practice, the OPA requested surveys of rents from the BLS and Work Projects Administration (WPA) to determine areas in which rising rents threatened the defense program. In most cases, defense rental area boundaries followed county lines because the OPA found more precise delineation of areas undergoing rent increases to be too time-consuming.
The method of rent control was to set a 'maximum rent date' as a base date for freezing rents.
The OPA determined a maximum rent date that was meant to pre-date increases caused by defense activities (Porter, 1943) . Once a base date was chosen, the OPA required each rental unit to be registered, and surveyed individual landlords and their tenants to determine the rent on the base date. The rent for each dwelling was then frozen at this level. 6 Choice of the base date was flexible 5 The discussion that follows, except where noted otherwise, is summarized from Harvey C. Mansfield and Associates (1948) .
6 In cases where landlords made improvements or reduced services provided, the level at which rents were frozen except that it had to be the first of a month. In practice, however, long rollbacks were found to be problematic. After the first wave of rent control imposition, March 1, 1942, which was the base date used for other goods under the General Maximum Price Regulation, became a common freeze date for newly controlled areas.
Rent control was pervasive, and continued to be imposed in new areas even after the end of the war. As shown in Table 1 Despite widespread federal price and rent control, the OPA did not have the authority to control real estate sales prices or commercial rents. 9 As discussed further below, house prices rose dramatically during the war, giving landlords even greater incentive to withhold or withdraw units from the rental market in order to sell them on the uncontrolled market for owner-occupancy. The OPA recognized this incentive and initially attempted to counteract it by imposing restrictions on eviction. A reportedly more common evasive device was for the landlord to sell the dwelling to the present occupant with a low down-payment, but with regular payments above the maximum rent. In response to this type of evasion, the OPA imposed a restriction in October 1942 that down-payments had to be at least one third of the purchase price (later relaxed to one-fifth) and had to be paid in cash. Nevertheless, conversion of units to owner-occupancy was recognized as a could be adjusted. In cases where a unit existed but was not rented on the base date, the rent was negotiated between the landlord and tenant but was subject to OPA adjustment. New construction projects had to be approved by the Federal Housing Administration and were subject to an FHA-imposed rent ceiling. 7 Data on rent control regulations by county and defense rental area used in this paper, including dates of designation as defense rental areas, dates of control, and maximum rent dates, are from various issues of the Federal Register.
8 Rent control in Washington and Flint was similar to federal rent control: the Flint ordinance was closely modeled on federal rent control, and federal control itself was modeled partly on the DC law.
9 As noted in Harvey C. Mansfield and Associates (1948) , from the beginning the OPA recognized this lack of authority would be a weak point in its rent control program, but decided not to seek the power to control sales prices or commercial rents out of fear that doing so would make the imposition of rent controls politically infeasible. OPA tried on two later occasions to obtain the power to impose price ceilings, but failed. The politics of price control in the housing sector was just one example of the influence of congressional-executive politics on the price control program: Fetter (1974) provides a broader discussion.
problem throughout the operation of federal rent control.
Consistent with OPA's recognition of this problem, many observers in the postwar decade argued, based on aggregate national trends, that rent control led to a shift towards higher rates of home ownership. Friedman and Stigler (1946) , quoted above, is one well-known example. Humes and Schiro (1946) documented the wartime withdrawal of units from the sample of rental dwellings the BLS used for its cost-of-living index, and claimed that "forced purchases probably constituted a substantial part of these transactions." The history of the OPA in Harvey C. Mansfield and Associates (1948) agreed, noting that "the rent control program undoubtedly contributed to the movement of properties from the rental to the sale market." Grebler (1952) argued that rent control was particularly important in the movement of single-family dwellings from renter-to owner-occupancy, and the Census Bureau's summary of trends in home ownership in the 1940's (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1953) also attributed increases partly to federal rent control.
An important role for rent control in the increase in home ownership in the early 1940's is made more plausible by the fact that the increase largely represented conversion of dwellings from renter-to owner-occupancy, rather than new construction. Although the mid-century increase in home ownership has often been thought of as primarily a post-war phenomenon, associated with the construction of new homes in suburban areas (Jackson, 1985) , the years during World War II saw unusually low construction due to restrictions on building. Despite the contemporaneous claims that rent control was a major driver behind wartime increases in home ownership and the national evidence consistent with it, little evidence has been advanced to support them other than aggregate national trends. Given the other large changes occurring at the same time that may also have encouraged a shift to higher rates of home ownership -such as rising real incomes and savings, the rise in marginal tax rates, or expectations of future growth -this paper attempts to isolate useful geographic and temporal variation to test whether rent control contributed to this shift.
Data

Sales and rental classified ad data
The first part of the analysis below exploits the timing of the imposition of rent control across cities.
There is no data on housing tenure at a sufficiently high temporal frequency to examine shifts into home ownership directly, but changes in the number of newspaper advertisements offering houses for sale is likely to provide a rough measure of the degree to which property owners chose to attempt to sell in response to the imposition of rent control. Moreover, examining changes in the number of ads offering units for rent provides an indication of the degree to which rent control reduced the supply of rental dwellings. 10 For one newspaper from each of nine cities, I have collected data on the number of ads offering houses for sale, and the number of ads offering rooms or units for rent, on the first Sunday of each March, June, September, and December from 1939 to 1946. 11
City tenure data
The second part of the analysis looks directly at changes in home ownership. The tenure data allowing me to do so come from a set of newly digitized housing surveys carried out by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) between 1944 and early 1947 (Humes and Schiro, 1946 ; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1947a Census, , 1948 . Surveys were carried out in most large cities, as well as smaller cities that were thought to be experiencing serious housing shortages (Humes and Schiro, 1946) . The primary purpose of the surveys was to estimate the number of vacant dwelling units, but in many cities information was also collected on tenure, dwelling unit condition, and the number of persons per room. Different cities were surveyed at different times; most of the 10 This paper is not the first to use newspaper advertisements to estimate the effects of rent control on housing supply: MacLennan (1978) used a simple time series of ads for furnished rental dwellings in Glasgow to show that its 1974 Rent Act, which put furnished dwellings under rent control, corresponded with a decrease in ads for furnished dwellings. But to my knowledge, my paper is the first to use this method with comparison cities as a 'control,' as well as the first to use it to look at the response in sales for owner-occupancy.
11 The nine cities are those that both have digital images of classified ads available consistently throughout the sample period, and also have clear headings in the classified ad section that allowed a straightforward classification of ads into offered sales and offered rentals (as opposed to, for example, houses or rental units wanted). The cities are Chicago; Cleveland; Dallas; Los Angeles; New Orleans; New York City; Portland, Oregon; Seattle; and Washington. Because many ads that advertised multiple properties did not specify the exact number available, I use counts of the number of distinct advertisements rather than the number of distinct properties. I provide further details in the data appendix. is approximately -0.155, corresponding to an R 2 of 0.024 in a regression of one on the other. Prior to control, the average city had seen a 6 percentage point rise in rents, and with the imposition of control the average reduction in rents was about 2 percent. Average appreciation in home asking prices suggests that the initial reduction in rents understates the true degree of rent control severity, however: in the 35 cities for which a measure is available, the median asking price in September 1945 was, on average, 56 percent higher in nominal terms than it was in April 1940.
Results
Evidence from the timing of imposition
I begin by exploiting variation in the timing of imposition of rent control in the nine cities for which I have data on newspaper advertisements. As a rough measure of the supply of dwellings for rent or for sale, I use the number of ads of each type. 16 The basic specification is
for city c observed in quarter t. This specification controls flexibly for fixed city characteristics and time shocks common across cities. Importantly, it also allows an assessment of the identifying assumption by testing whether cities appeared to be on different trends prior to the imposition of control. I begin by estimating a separate coefficient for each relative quarter from 7 quarters prior to 7 quarters following control, plus a common coefficient for all quarters 8 or more before and one for 8 or more after control. The omitted category is the quarter immediately preceding the quarter in which rent control was imposed. In some specifications below, I augment equation
(1) by controlling for city-specific linear time trends and city-specific season (quarter of year) fixed effects. The motivation for including the latter is pronounced seasonality in advertisements that appears to have been specific to a few cities in the sample. I estimate standard errors clustered by city; following Imbens and Kolesar (2012) , I use the Bell and McCaffrey (2002) adjustment for both standard errors and hypothesis testing to account for the small number of clusters (nine).
The first finding from this analysis is that by this measure, rent control did lead to a reduction in supply of units for rent. Figure 3 shows the estimated γ τ coefficients when I estimate equation
(1) augmented with city-specific trends and city-season fixed effects. The coefficient estimates, along with those from alternative specifications, are shown in Appendix Table A1 . There is some indication of a pre-existing downward trend in the number of units being offered for rent prior to the actual imposition of control. This is not very surprising, given that it was a growing demand for rental housing that led to the imposition of control; as apartments came to be occupied, fewer rental units may have been advertised. The more important feature of the graph is that the trend in rental advertisements turns more sharply downwards around the time of control. That the sharper reduction appears to have begun in the quarter before control was actually imposed may also not be surprising, given that it was known to most landlords in advance that their units would fall under control.
The same type of specification suggests that rent control led to an increase in the supply of houses for sale. Figure 4 plots the estimates of γ τ for the log number of sale advertisements, from a specification that augments equation (1) with city-specific trends and city-season fixed effects.
These coefficients and those from alternative specifications are also shown in Appendix Table A1 .
Here there is little indication of a differential trend in cities pre-dating the imposition of rent control, providing support for the identifying assumption. The coefficients for the first period of control and afterwards indicate a differential uptick in the number of sale ads immediately after the imposition of rent control, leveling out at a number of sale advertisements about .2 log points higher about a year after the imposition of control. The coefficients for individual quarters are somewhat imprecisely estimated, as might be expected given only nine clusters. But the general pattern of coefficients is highly suggestive of a differential increase in sales at the time of rent control imposition that continued for several quarters thereafter.
The results from the analysis of newspaper ads provide a first piece of evidence that rent control reduced the supply of units for rental and, consistent with arguments made at the time, stimulated the sale of houses. Yet these results do not directly test whether rent control induced a shift toward a higher rate of home ownership; to do so, I turn to variation across cities in the severity of rent control.
Evidence from cross-city variation in control severity
Since all cities in the sample were placed under rent control between 1940 and the first tenure survey, for the analysis of changes in tenure I use variation across cities in the severity of rent control: the degree to which rent control forced down rents. The key variation I exploit is that conditional on the degree of pre-control rent appreciation, the OPA's choice of base date brought down rents to different degrees in different cities. The idea is illustrated in Figure 5 . For each city, the left vertical line marks the base date, and the right vertical line marks the date on which rent control was imposed. The rent indices for Baltimore and Buffalo show that they both saw large increases in rents from March 1940 to mid-1942. Yet in Baltimore, the choice of base date brought down rents substantially, whereas the choice of base date in Buffalo meant that rent control had much less initial impact on rents. 17 The measure of severity I use below is the percent decline in rents, at the time that rent control was imposed, that would be implied by a return to the rents on the base date: it is the difference between the pre-control maximum value of the NICB rent index and its value in the base date month, normalized by the pre-control maximum value. 18 Note that controlling for the degree of pre-control rent appreciation is crucial to avoid the obvious difficulty of comparing, for example, Baltimore and Boston: the latter had much lower severity at the time that rent control was put in place, but only due to the absence of substantial appreciation in rents prior to control. My main specifications below attempt to avoid comparisons of the latter type, since differences in changes in home ownership between Baltimore and Boston may simply be due to differences in the growth of housing demand.
The simple relationship between increases in home ownership over the early 1940's and the degree to which rent control reduced rents at the time of imposition -what I refer to as the severity of control -is shown in Figure 6 . The estimated relationship in the figure does not control for the different timing of surveys in different cities, and also does not isolate the variation in 17 One concern that arises here is how the choice of base date was related to underlying characteristics of cities that may also have predicted differential changes in home ownership: in a robustness check below, I attempt to address this concern by exploiting variation induced by the 'default' base date of March 1, 1942. 18 In Figure 5 it is evident that the rent indices did not always fall to the base date values at the time of imposition of rent control: this may be because rent control was not fully successful in reducing rents, or because of a change in the composition of units in the NICB sample. I use the value of the rent index in the base month rather than after control because these differences may be a result of the imposition of rent control.
severity associated with the level of rents on the base date by controlling for the degree of rent appreciation prior to control. Nevertheless, a first fact to note is that cities in which rent control was more severe had greater increases in home ownership during the early 1940's.
To explore this relationship further, the basic regression specification for city i, with first housing survey in year t, is
where ∆ t,40 (home ownership rate) i is the percentage point change in home ownership between April 1940 and the first survey date for city i, carried out in month t. Since the dependent variable is specified as a difference, this specification implicitly controls for time-invariant city characteristics: the right-hand-side controls in the vector X i allow for differential trends according to city characteristics. Among the key controls included in X i is the maximum pre-control rent appreciation in city i; by doing so I draw comparisons between cities that had similar degrees of rent appreciation prior to control, and exploit variation in severity associated with the different level of rents on the base date. Other controls included are the city's change in home ownership from 1930 to 1940 as well as its change from 1920 to 1930; I also include three separate controls for the share of housing units in 1940 that were single-family and owned, rented, and vacant. These variables help to capture the possibility that some cities had greater potential for increases in home ownership than others. Except where specified otherwise, the function controlling for common time effects, α(t), is allowed to be piecewise linear: I include a set of fixed effects for survey year, and flexible linear trends by survey month within each survey year. The relatively small size of the NICB sample, and the skewed distribution of the severity measure, make the downward bias in the usual Huber-White robust standard errors a concern. Accordingly, I follow Imbens and Kolesar (2012) and report HC2 standard errors, along with p-values that correspond to a t-distribution with the degrees of freedom adjustment proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) . Table 4 confirms that cities with greater severity had larger increases in home ownership. Column (1) corrects the simple relationship shown in Figure 6 by controlling for common time effects, but does not yet control for the maximum degree of rent appreciation. The coefficient suggests that an increase in severity of 2.5 percentage points -roughly a standard deviation in the NICB sample -was associated with roughly a 1.1 percentage point greater increase in home ownership during the early 1940's, with a p-value of 0.023.
The main test of the rent control hypothesis is the specification in column (2), which adds a control for the maximum pre-control rent appreciation, as well as the baseline set of controls described above. The relationship between severity and increased home ownership does not appear to be driven by the degree of pre-control rent appreciation (and hence does not merely reflect These coefficients are quite large -they suggest that an initially modest difference of about 2 percentage points in the reduction in rents led to an increase in home ownership of roughly 1 percentage point, or 10 percent of the sample average. Note that this is a measure of the initial severity of control, corresponding to the time when rent control was first imposed. Using only rental market data as of the date of imposition of control, rather than measuring changes in prices relative to rents in the succeeding years, has the advantage that the measure is less influenced by endogenous decisions that potential sellers, tenants, or buyers make in response to rent control.
But since landlords' decisions were presumably based on the relative returns to continuing to rent or selling their properties, and house price appreciation during the period was quite large, it is helpful to shed some light on whether the initial severity of rent control affected appreciation in house prices. 19
19 From a theoretical perspective, it is ambiguous whether rent control should increase or decrease prices in the uncontrolled market for owner-occupied dwellings. Much of the early research on this question focused on the potential effects of excess demand for rental housing spilling over into the uncontrolled market. Fallis and Smith (1984) , for example, noted that the most natural assumptions on how controlled housing implied that rent control would raise rents in the uncontrolled rental sector, and in their empirical application argued that rent control raised rents for uncontrolled units. More recent work has focused on housing externalities operating through maintenance To assess the effect of rent control on house prices in this setting, I estimate specifications similar to equation (2) with home asking price appreciation from April 1940 to September 1945 as the dependent variable. It is worth bearing in mind that the measure of house price appreciation is available for only 35 of the sample cities, which were likely selected due to high rates of house price growth. Hence, I regard these results as somewhat more speculative than those for home ownership, but they do at least provide a check on the plausibility of the rent control hypothesis.
The results in Table 5 suggest that cities with greater initial rent control severity saw greater house price appreciation from 1940 to 1945. 20 In particular, the specification in column (3), which contains the full set of controls, gives a coefficient of 3.984 (and a p-value of 0.030), suggesting that an initial level of severity greater by 2.5 percentage points was associated with appreciation in house prices that was greater by 10 percentage points. These results suggest that even modest differences in initial severity translated into much more substantial differences in landlords' relative returns to selling their properties or continuing to rent them out.
Robustness
The identifying assumption in the main specifications is that conditional on the maximum precontrol rent appreciation, the reduction in rents induced by rent control was unrelated to underlying city trends that were also associated with differential trends in home ownership. To help support this assumption, I take two complementary approaches. First, I introduce variables likely to be correlated with a range of possible alternative explanations for increased home ownership -rising incomes or savings, the growing tax preferences towards owner-occupied housing, and changing expectations for future growth. Second, to address possible correlation between the OPA's choice of base date and underlying trends in cities, I re-estimate my main specifications on the sample cities controlled after the initial wave of rent control, all of which were assigned the 'default' base date of March 1, 1942.
and residential sorting; Autor, Palmer and Pathak (2012) found that the removal of rent control in Cambridge in the mid-1990's raised values of uncontrolled housing.
20 Note that since all cities were surveyed at the same time, I do not include survey time controls as in the tenure results.
Introducing additional controls for housing demand
Several other trends may have led to unusually sharp increases in home ownership rates during the early 1940's. Rising incomes and savings may have increased housing demand, possibly encouraging a shift towards ownership as a form of housing tenure. Since the rent control hypothesis is largely about decisions driving the supply of dwellings for owner-occupancy these are complementary explanations to some degree, but one might be concerned that the variation in severity that I use in the main specifications is still correlated with unobserved variation in demand. Another possibility is that the wartime rise in marginal income tax rates made the non-neutralities in the tax code between owner-and renter-occupied housing more relevant than they had been before, driving a shift towards owner-occupancy (Rosen and Rosen, 1980) . The abnormally low level of home ownership in 1940, after the foreclosures of the 1930's, may have led to an unusually fast increase as the 'overhang' of properties was sold off. Finally, the war may have raised expectations of future growth and encouraged greater home purchase. I assess whether or not these alternative explanations are likely to explain the main result by introducing additional controls that should provide a measure of geographic variation in these alternatives. All of these variables are plausibly affected by rent control itself, so that the coefficients on severity themselves should be interpreted with caution; the spirit of this exercise is to see whether inclusion of these variables leads to a substantial reduction in the severity coefficient.
The results shown above, in fact, already address two of these alternative hypotheses. Column (1) of Table 6 reproduces the final column from Table 4 . This specification already controls for the city's 1930-40 and 1920-30 changes in home ownership, making it unlikely that the rent control result is driven by depressed levels of home ownership in 1940. It also addresses the possibility that rising marginal tax rates increased home ownership during the war. Work studying geographic variation in housing tax benefits over the 1980's and 1990's (Gyourko and Sinai, 2003, 2004 ) uses more extensive data than are available for my sample, but as a rough approximation, differential changes in the tax benefit to owner-occupied housing as income tax rates rose during the 1940's should be correlated with city housing values in 1940. Column (1) also includes a control for the median owner-occupied housing value in 1940, and as seen in Table 4 , inclusion of this control did little to change the size of the severity coefficient. Hence, it is unlikely that spatial variation in the tax benefit to owner-occupied housing explains the rent control result.
I address a range of other concerns in columns (2) through (4), adding controls that are likely to be correlated with income, savings, and expectations of future city growth (in Appendix Table A3 I introduce each individually). There is no data directly measuring city-or county-level personal incomes over this period, so I use two alternative measures: the change in log retail sales per capita from 1939 -1948 , following Cullen and Fishback (2012 , and the change in the log total dollar value of manufacturing wages from 1939 to 1947. As a first proxy for savings, I use the 1943-44 trend in log bank deposits. Although the change in bank deposits relative to 1940 would be preferable, the 1943-44 change should at least provide a measure of the trend in savings growth over the war years. 21 I also include a control for county E-bond sales per capita. Both of these types of savings could of course substitute for saving in the form of housing, but it may be that differential shocks to the ability to save translated into greater saving in all forms. Two final controls in column (2) are the change in log county civilian population from 1940 to 1943 and total county World War II spending from 1940-1945 (normalized by the 1940 population). These variables are meant to serve as additional controls for the size of the housing demand shock across cities. Finally, to proxy for expectations of future growth, I control for the share of war housing that was privately financed.
The rationale for doing so is that when future demand for housing was uncertain, war housing tended to be publicly financed (National Housing Agency, 1945b) .
The results suggest that the rent control result is not driven by correlated trends in incomes, savings, or housing demand. Including controls for income, savings, as well as county war spending and population change, in fact, increases the coefficient on severity from .473 to .648, with only a slight decrease in precision. Data on financing of war housing are unavailable for two cities in my sample, so in column (3) I re-estimate the main specification omitting these two, and add a control 21 As an alternative to using the 1943-44 change in total bank deposits, in the appendix I use an estimate of the 1936-44 change in per capita bank deposits, with the 1936 value obtained from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2001). Relative to using the 1943-44 change, the 1936-44 change introduces two complications: the first is that there is no data on 1936 bank deposits for one of my sample cities (Richmond), and the second is that population must be imputed for both 1936 and 1944 (I do so by linearly interpolating population for 1936 and using the estimated 1943 civilian population for 1944). The point estimate for rent control severity is qualitatively similar (and not significantly different) using the alternative measures of bank deposits, although using the 1936-44 change does reduce its precision.
for financing of war housing in column (4). Although less precisely estimated, the coefficient of .562 is quite similar to the 0.473 that I estimate in the baseline specification. Altogether, the evidence in Table 6 suggests that these alternative stories do not explain the relationship between rent control severity and increased home ownership.
Exploiting the 'default' base date
A second approach addresses the question of whether the assigned base date, and greater corresponding rent reductions in particular, were correlated with unobserved factors also pushing towards higher home ownership. It is not obvious that the bias would most naturally be expected to go in this direction. For example, suppose that defense production stimulates demand for rental housing more than for owner-occupied housing because it is expected to be a temporary labor demand shock.
If the OPA chose base dates to reduce rents more in cities where rent increases were associated with defense activities, as the institutional background in Section 2 suggested, then greater rent control severity should have been related to greater demand shocks for rental, not owned, housing.
Nevertheless, I attempt to address any potential bias in favor of the rent control hypothesis by isolating idiosyncratic variation in rent control severity using the OPA's "default" base date.
In particular, the OPA devoted much attention to setting city-specific base dates in the initial wave of rent control imposition in the summer of 1942, and a number of different base dates were used. By October 1942, however, nearly all newly controlled counties were assigned the default base date of March 1, 1942: 92 of 97 counties controlled in October, 197 of 198 counties controlled in November, and 111 of 112 counties controlled in December. Twenty cities in my sample were controlled over these three months, and all shared the common base date.
I re-estimate a variant on my main specification on the sample of cities controlled between October and December 1942, making it slightly more parsimonious given the smaller size of the sample. By controlling for maximum pre-control rent appreciation and testing for differences in increases in home ownership in cities that had sharper initial rent reductions when rolled back to March 1942, this specification exploits variation in the precise timing of rent increases. The spirit of this test is to compare two cities with similar maximum pre-control rent appreciation, one of which had an "earlier" increase in rent (by March 1942) and hence lower rent control severity, and the other of which had a "later" increase in rent (after March 1942) and hence greater rent control severity. The identification assumption is that given that cities eventually had similar rent appreciation before control, the degree of rent appreciation by March 1942 was unrelated to unobserved factors that drove differential trends in home ownership. Below I present evidence supporting this assumption.
The results in Table 7 for this smaller sample are, in fact, substantially larger than the main estimates: the coefficient in column (2), which controls for the maximum pre-control rent appreciation, suggests that a severity greater by 1 percentage point was associated with a 2 percentage point greater increase in home ownership over the 1940's. Across the columns I add additional controls with relatively modest changes in the coefficient. Controlling for the income, savings, and expectations variables as in Table 6 leaves the coefficients similarly unchanged (results available on request).
The identifying assumption for this robustness check is that conditional on the eventual degree of pre-control rent appreciation, the precise timing of the appreciation is not correlated with unobserved factors that themselves led to greater increases in home ownership. As a check on this assumption, I re-estimate the specification in column (3) of Table 7 using months from March 1941 to February 1942 as 'placebo' base dates. If the relationship between rent control severity and home ownership is due to unobserved factors associated with early rent increases, then calculating the implied reduction to an earlier base date should produce similar results. I show the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for each placebo date as well as the true one in Figure 7 (this uses HC2 standard errors with the usual (n − k) degrees of freedom).
The results support the identifying assumption: conditional on the eventual degree of rent appreciation, "later" rent appreciation does not appear to be correlated with greater increases in home ownership except when it coincides with greater rent control severity. Using any of the months from March through December 1941 as a placebo base date delivers estimates that are not statistically significantly different from zero, and for which the point estimates themselves are relatively close to zero. Only when the placebo base date approaches the true one do the estimates begin to become statistically significant (and given serial correlation in rents, we would expect to begin seeing larger and more significant effects as the placebo dates approach the true one).
One interpretation of the much larger estimates of the effect of rent control in the late-controlled sample than in the main estimates is that the OPA's choice of base date introduced a downward bias in the main results. It is possible that other factors could have played a role as well, however.
The cities controlled at the end of 1942 were smaller on average, had less war spending, and smaller average rent increases. They also had slightly less multifamily housing and slightly more singlefamily housing. Converting multi-family housing to owner-occupancy was surely more difficult than converting single-family housing, and the late-controlled cities may have had greater elasticity of conversion as a result. It may also be that the effects of rent control are heterogeneous, or that enforcement of rent control regulations differed in cities that had lesser relative importance in the defense manufacturing program.
Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the effects of rent control during World War II. The analysis suggests that rent control induced landlords to withdraw their units from the rental stock in order to sell them for owner-occupancy at uncontrolled prices.
Two complementary analyses give evidence in support of this hypothesis. First, in a newly compiled dataset on newspaper advertisements from 1939 to 1946, I use variation in the timing of imposition of rent control, and show that cities saw differential increases in the number of sale advertisements at the time of control and for at least several quarters thereafter.
Second, in a new dataset on city-level changes in tenure, rents, and house prices during the first half of the 1940's, I show that conditional on the degree of pre-control rent appreciation, cities in which rent control was more severe at the time of control -as measured by the degree to which control was meant to lower rents -had greater increases in home ownership. This relationship is stable across specifications that allow for differential trends by a variety of pre-1940 characteristics, and is not explained by differential changes in income, savings, tax benefits to home owners, expectations across cities, or endogenous choice of base dates.
While the results suggest that rent control played an important role in the increase in home ownership in urban areas facing wartime housing shortages, it is also clear that other factors were at work in driving the broader national change. These include rising incomes and savings and the extension of the income tax, as described above; it is also noteworthy that home ownership rose rapidly in rural as well as urban areas, possibly for different reasons. It is likely also important to give more consideration to the role that war housing construction played, and how it interacted with these trends. Future work has much to illuminate regarding the extraordinary changes in housing markets during World War II. 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 total in 1−unit structures in 2−unit structures in 3+ unit structures Notes: Graph shows γτ coefficients from estimating equation (1) with dependent variable ln(#rent ads), augmented with city-specific linear time trends and city-quarter (season) fixed effects. Omitted quarter is the quarter before control was imposed. Vertical line separates last quarter before control from quarter in which control was imposed. Bands represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, using Bell and McCaffrey (2002) Notes: Graph shows γτ coefficients from estimating equation (1) with dependent variable ln(#sale ads), augmented with city-specific linear time trends and city-quarter (season) fixed effects. Omitted quarter is the quarter before control was imposed. Vertical line separates last quarter before control from quarter in which control was imposed. Bands represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, using Bell and McCaffrey (2002) standard errors and degrees of freedom clustered by city. Notes: x-axis shows percent change in NICB rent index from the maximum pre-control rent to the level on the freeze date. y-axis shows percentage-point change in home ownership between the 1940 Census and the first intercensal tenure survey carried out in each city. Markers indicate the year of the first tenure survey. Coefficient estimate and 95% CI mar41 apr41 may41 jun41 jul41 aug41 sep41 oct41 nov41 dec41 jan42 feb42 mar42
Placebo base date Notes: graph shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals (using HC2 standard errors and a t distribution with n − k degrees of freedom) from estimating equation (2) on the late-controlled sample, using each month on the x-axis as a 'placebo' base date. (For all cities, March 1942 was the true base date.) (1945, 1946, 1947b) . Appendix 1: Data
Newspaper advertisements
As noted in the text, the data on advertisements of housing for sale or rent comes from nine cities for which digital images of classified ads were available consistently throughout the sample period, with headings in the classified ad section that allow a straightforward classification of ads into offered sales and offered rentals. The nine newspapers are the Chicago Tribune, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Dallas Morning News, the Los Angeles Times, the New Orleans Times-Picayune, the New York Times, the Portland Oregonian, the Seattle Times, and the Washington Post. In each city, I use the count of ads appearing on the first Sunday of each March, June, September, and December. I include housing in the city or suburban areas. For the New York Times, I exclude ads for housing in suburban areas that were put under control after the first wave of rent control in New York City (for example, counties in New Jersey, Connecticut, and some nearby counties in New York State were put under control either earlier or later than New York City was).
The count of ads offering housing for rent generally includes advertisements offering rooms, room and board, hotel rooms (typically offering weekly or monthly rates), houses, or apartments.
In cities where classifications such as "flats" or "bungalows" are also used it also includes these categories. The count of sale ads comprises primarily houses for sale.
These counts attempt to exclude certain types of advertisements. Among the excluded ads are those for rooms to share; ads for room and board for children or convalescents; ads for the sale of unimproved land; ads for the sale of "income property," such as apartment buildings or farms; ads for summer homes, beachfront or resort properties; ads for exchange of real estate; ads for home building or financing; and ads offering homes "for rent or sale." A caveat is that sometimes ads for empty lots are included in the same classification as ads for homes in suburban areas. As a rule, the counts include or exclude entire classifications of ads, rather than trying to distinguish between different types of ads under the same classification. Hence, when ads for empty lots are included under classifications that primarily advertise homes, they are included in the total count.
Appendix 2: Additional Tables   Table A1: Newspaper ads: response to imposition of rent control Bell and McCaffrey (2002) to adjust for a small number of clusters ( †: < 0.15, * : < 0.10, * * : < 0.05, * * * : < 0.01). Notes: HC2 standard errors in parentheses. P-value stars ( †: p < 0.15, * : p < 0.10, * * : p < 0.05) correspond to a t-distribution with the conventional degrees-of-freedom (n-k). For other notes, see Table 4 . 
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